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BOOK REVIEW
The Mote in Thy Brother's Eye:'

A Review of Human Rights as Politics
and Idolatry
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS
UNIVERSITY PRESS,

As

POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (PRINCETON

2001)

By
William M. Carter, Jr.*
I.
INTRODUCTION

Michael Ignatieff s provocatively titled collection of essays,2 Human
Rights As Politics and Idolatry [hereinafter Human Rights], is a careful examination of the theoretical underpinnings and contradictions in the area of human
rights. At bottom, both of his primary essays, Human Rights As Politics and
Human Rights As Idolatry, make a claim that is perhaps contrary to the instincts
of human rights thinkers and activists: namely, that international human rights
can best be philosophically justified and effectively applied to the extent that
they strive for minimalism. Human rights activists generally argue for the opposite conclusion: that international human rights be construed as broadly as possible, both in terms of the substantive rights protected and to whom those rights
should apply. Ignatieff argues that a minimalist conception of human rights is
necessary for human rights to have maximum moral force and acceptance, and
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author

would like to thank Amy Klosterman for her research assistance and thoughts on this review, and,
especially, Abigail Horn, whose enduring patience and understanding have made this review (and
this career) possible.
1. The entirety of this venerable quote is:
Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be
judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. And why
beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that
is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out
of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out
the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out
of thy brother's eye.
Matt. 7:1-5 (King James).
2. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RiGHTs As POLTIcs AND IDOLATRY (2001) [hereinafter
HUMAN RiGHTs]
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he adduces persuasive geopolitical evidence in support of his conclusions.
Taken together, these essays advance a minimalist conception of human rights
limited to those rights necessary to protect human "agency"; that is, those rights
strictly necessary to protect a person's ability to make choices with dignity. In
doing so, Ignatieff seeks to defend human rights from criticisms of Western
cultural imperialism and lack of moral grounding, while demonstrating that
human rights activists need not retreat into cultural relativism to make such a
defense. Readers should understand that Ignatieff, despite taking human rights
activists to task for certain inconsistencies, is attempting to support human rights
by providing a consistent and principled theoretical basis for them. In short,
Ignatieff' s critique is best seen as a good-faith challenge intended to strengthen
the international human fights movement, even if the reader does not agree with
his ultimate conclusions.
The book is fascinating, not only because of the well-reasoned content of
its main essays, but also for its structure. It is essentially an extended Socratic
dialogue. Ignatieff's positions are critiqued, first in the introduction by Amy
Gutmann, then in responses by four eminent scholars. 3 Ignatieff then considers
the views of the commentators in his rebuttal and candidly addresses the flaws
or gaps they point out. In all, Ignatieff's primary essays, the responses, and his
rebuttal make an important contribution to our thinking about human rights.
The book is doubly laudatory for achieving this with only occasional forays into
the philosophically opaque, and therefore should hold substantial appeal for
human fights activists who are not philosophers, academics, or lawyers.
This review addresses an area touched, but not squarely confronted, by
many of the essays in Human Rights. It will argue that international human
fights should be treated as more than a series of laudatory goals or a "discourse"
(in Ignatieff's words) among societies about values. Rather, the body of agreements and principles that we characterize as "human fights" is properly understood as law. Recognizing the essentially "legal" nature of the human rights
principles articulated in various multinational agreements in the second half of
the twentieth century helps mollify some of the criticisms Ignatieff raises. In
short, disagreement about the philosophical underpinnings of human rights becomes less important when those rights are treated more as law than as moral
philosophy. And if the victims of human fights abuses should be the focus of
the inquiry (as all the commentators in the book agree should be the case), then
it is perhaps fair to ask if those victims should care whether the law on which
they rely to stop abuses is grounded in Western or Eastern thought, religious
doctrine, or secular humanism, as long as it is effective.
In recognition of the true scope of the questions raised by such an approach, this review will address at length only one aspect of the view that human
3. Professor Gutmann, the editor of the book, is Provost and Professor of Politics at Princeton
University. The commentators are K. Anthony Appiah, Professor of Afro-American Studies and
Philosophy at Harvard University; David A. Hollinger, Professor of History at the University of
California at Berkeley; Thomas W. Laqueur, Professor of History at the University of California at
Berkeley; and Diane F. Orentlicher, Professor of Law at American University.
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rights are "law." Specifically, this article contends that there is a better chance
of achieving maximalist goals, despite Ignatieff s thoughtful counsel to the contrary, where states actually treat human rights as law by giving international
human rights domestic enforceability. Incorporating human rights law into domestic legal systems may, in many countries, require major reordering of those
legal systems, a goal not readily achievable. In the United States, however,
Constitutional and statutory mechanisms already exist which, properly understood, require domestic courts to enforce international human rights law. If
there were currently a supranational body with the ability to regularly enforce
human rights law, 4 then much of Ignatieff's explanation for a minimalist view of
human rights would be undercut. We would not necessarily need a coherent
moral foundation that tries to achieve maximum adherence among nationsstates would obey human rights law because a superior authority could force
them to do so. 5 In the absence of such a superior authority, however, consistent
treatment of international human rights law as "law" domestically (that is to say,
having domestic enforceability in suits brought by individuals) comes a close
second. By truly applying international standards internally, rather than seeking
degree of
only to export them, Western nations can impart a more substantial
6
cross-cultural legitimacy to international human rights law.
As the eight hundred pound gorilla on the world stage, the United States
can enhance the understanding of human rights as law through leadership by
example and by a recognition that it cannot, in fact, do whatever it wishes in the
human rights arena. Aside from defending a nation that presents itself as one of
the leading proponents of human rights worldwide against charges of hypocrisy
and cultural imperialism, a mature domestic jurisprudence of international
human rights as law would contribute to the growing "international judicial dia4. This review recognizes that there are currently ad hoc tribunals that enforce international
criminal or humanitarian law, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the permanent International Criminal Court has similar jurisdiction; it
entered into force on 1 July, 2002, having received the necessary 60 ratifications (despite efforts by
the United States to undermine the ICC, see, e.g., Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, in HUMAN
RIGrs, supra note 2, at 13.). These bodies, particularly the ICC, are of tremendous importance.
Outside of military conflicts, however, there is currently no supranational body that has the ability to
effectively enforce international human rights law. While certain regional bodies, such as the InterAmerican and European Courts of Human Rights, do have some ability to grant "fair compensation"
to victims of human rights violations, they must largely rely on states to agree to adhere to their
rulings.
5. Even the existence of such a supranational body, however, would not completely eliminate
the need for the type of analysis Ignatieff ably performs. The mere threat of a bigger stick would not
necessarily lead to more internalization of human rights law in countries, which should (as Ignatieff
recognizes) be the eventual goal. Nor would such a supranational body fully defend against the
charges of Western cultural imperialism, should such a body only seek to enforce nominally "Westem" values.
6. This is a point Ignatieff recognizes at several points in his essays. See Ignatieff, Human
Rights as Politics,in HUMAN RIorrs, supra note 2, at 36 ("it is inconsistent to impose international
human rights restraints on other states unless we accept the jurisdiction of these instruments on our
own"); Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN RIrrs, supra note 2, at 92 ("[U]niversality
[of human rights] properly means consistency: the West is obliged to practice what it preaches. This
puts the West, no less than the rest of the world, on permanent trial.")
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7
logue" on the contours and interpretation of that body of law. This is not to say
that U.S. courts must necessarily find that, for example, the death penalty violates international human rights law. Rather, the United States must show that it
takes human rights law seriously by applying international human rights law in
making that determination.8 In the context of the issues raised by Ignatieff's
book, the process is equally as important as the outcome. This review will
show, pointing specifically to a recent decision of a federal district court in New
York, 9 that international human rights law is indeed federal "law" that may be
domestically enforced.

II.
HUMAN RIGHTS AS DISCOURSE AMONG NATIONS

Ignatieff s first essay, Human Rights as Politics, provides a good summary
of the "juridical, advocacy, and enforcement revolutions" in human rights in the
latter half of the twentieth century. After reviewing this evidence of moral progress, he takes human rights activists to task for treating human rights as
"trumps": that is, the tendency to treat human rights language as bringing political disputes to closure. Rather, he argues, human rights are properly seen as
politics-a starting point for deliberation about morally acceptable practices.
Treating human rights as politics, rather than a set of "moral trump cards," he
argues, helps the human rights community defend against charges of Western
cultural imperialism and provides defensible and defined limits to humanitarian
intervention. Such a conception of human rights also gives human rights activists the ability to effectively "take sides" against certain practices, because explicitly treating human rights as politics eliminates the need to make difficult-todefend claims about moral neutrality.
Because international human ights norms cannot effectively be imposed
from the outside, human rights doctrine must seek moral grounds for agreement
among cultures. Ignatieff therefore argues that human rights language should be
limited to making demands necessary to protect human "agency"-the ability of
individuals to make choices for themselves with dignity. A politics of human
rights focused on protecting human agency is crucial to the success of the
human rights movement, Ignatieff believes, because cultures of various orientations are most likely to find common ground in the proposition that international
human rights law protects "the right of people to construe dignity as they wish,
not the content they give to it." 10
7. See generally Developments in the Law-InternationalCriminal Law: VI. The International JudicialDialogue: When Domestic ConstitutionalCourts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2049 (2001).
8. See Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, inHUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 2, at 37. See also
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370-76 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissing challenge to death penalty based
on treaties and customary international law).
9. Standt v. New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See discussion infra Part IV.
10. Ignatieff, Dignity and Agency, in HUMAN RiGHTs, supra note 2, at 165. Thomas Laqueur's
commentary argues for expanding the "politics" of human rights beyond "rights" language, to include support for the social and cultural conditions that can lead to an expansion of the "moral
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III.
THE MORAL UNDERPINNINGS OF HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND
"RIGHTS MINIMALISM"

Although Ignatieff's first essay is perhaps the most controversial, in that it
challenges the fundamental belief of most human rights advocates that human
rights are in fact "trumps," the second essay is ultimately more powerful. In
Human Rights as Idolatry, Ignatieff more directly addresses the moral underpinnings (or lack thereof) of international human rights doctrine. Ignatieff believes
that the human rights community has elevated human rights to the level of idolatry, contending that "[h]uman rights has become the major article of faith of a
secular culture that fears it believes in nothing else."' I He argues that this secular worship at the altar of human rights presents cultural and spiritual challenges
to its effectiveness.
The "spiritual" crisis described in the essay is that human rights activists
have intentionally divorced human rights claims from any particular religious or
spiritual grounding, in recognition of the fact that different cultures have varying
views of the moral underpinnings of rights. The Western human rights community rightly surmised that an explicitly Jeffersonian view that all people were
endowed by their (Christian, Protestant) Creator with the rights articulated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was unlikely to find agreement among
nations outside of the Western tradition. In an attempt to achieve universality,
the early human rights communities engaged in a deliberate silence about the
metaphysical underpinnings of human rights. This pragmatic silence has made
it easier for a global human rights community to emerge. Yet this separation
raises a fundamental inconsistency because international human rights doctrine
claims, for example, that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights,"' 2 but never articulates why. In other words, human rights doctrine-divorced from religious or spiritual underpinnings-never answers the
question, "What gives human beings the right to have rights?" Secular humanist
human rights doctrine instead makes the claim that human beings are special by
virtue of being human and it is this elevation of mankind to the level of the
sacred that can be seen as "idolatrous" by the religious. This analysis presents a
challenge that the human rights community would do well to take seriously,
given that the vast majority of the world does claim some spiritual or religious
allegiance. 13
imagination" to include distant rights abuses-"the capacity to somehow feel the exigency of
wrongs suffered by strangers at a distance." Thomas Laqueur, The Moral Imagination and Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 134.
Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 53.
11.
12. Id. at 77, citing Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
13. Diane Orentlicher's commentary argues that the human rights community needs to engage
religion, rather than seek to divorce claims of the legitimacy of human rights doctrine from religious
thought. Diane F. Orentlicher, Relativism and Religion, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, 141-58.
She believes that international human rights norms require internalization and acceptance by countries and cultures, and that human rights must therefore at least be consistent with these countries'
and cultures' religious foundations. In her words, "human rights cannot truly go global unless it
goes deeply local." Id. at 157. Orentlicher also argues that willingness to seriously engage religious
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Ignatieff believes one response to this challenge can be found in the theme
raised in the first essay: that human rights should be limited to protecting human
"agency" or negative liberty (i.e., the capacity of each individual to achieve
rational intentions without hindrance, in Ignatieff's words). This minimalist
conception of human rights is intended to address the challenge to universality
of substantive human rights norms. Ignatieff argues that it is only possible to
achieve a shared view of human rights where that view is "compatible with
diverging attitudes concerning what constitutes a good life."' 14 He believes that
international human rights norms are only compatible with this sort of moral
pluralism where they are based on the idea of protecting, for instance, the ability
of Muslim women to choose whether to wear a burqa, not where they mandate
the substance of that choice.
The second human rights crisis Ignatieff confronts is "cultural"; namely,
that the lack of a coherent moral grounding for international human rights doctrine leaves it open to serious challenge both within and outside the West. Ignatieff identifies political Islam and East Asia as the primary sources of the
external cultural crisis. As for political Islam, Ignatieff argues that certain substantive human rights values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, such as the right to freely choose one's spouse, are incompatible with
certain strains of political Islam, because they imply a sovereign individual
whose interests rise above the will of Allah as expressed in Koranic values regarding familial relationships. Similarly, the oft-noted "Asian values" model
presents a serious challenge to the claimed universality of human rights doctrine,
because it argues that the focus of human rights (i.e., Western ideals) on individualism subverts the ordered and functioning communitarian5 systems and values
necessary to enable enjoyment of these individual rights.'
The internal Western challenge Ignatieff addresses is the tendency of
human rights advocates to "trade away" too much in attempting to answer the
other challenges. Ignatieff argues that Western defenders of human rights risk
undermining their cause when they retreat into extreme cultural relativism by
conceding that "international human rights" is really solely synonymous with
"Western values." He contends that Western human rights advocates should recognize and argue that (1) the early history of international human rights included
many cultural traditions besides the West; (2) the Universal Declaration of
viewpoints in constructing and applying human rights norms does not necessarily require agreement
that these norms are based in any particular religion. Id. at 154-57.
14. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 55.
15. Orentlicher also addresses the cultural and spiritual crises that present serious challenges to
human rights doctrine's claims to universality. She argues that even the fundamental, minimalist
norms that Ignatieff advocates-the prohibition against torture, for example-may not achieve
universality without significant transformation within certain societies, which requires that human
rights have "broad and deep" legitimacy. Orentlicher accordingly argues that a sustainable theory of
human rights requires two elements beyond Ignatieff's analysis: (1)procedural inclusiveness, where
different cultures and perspectives truly have a seat at the table in constructing international human
rights norms; and (2) transnational collaboration, whereby human rights activists from different nations collaborate in the enforcement of human rights norms. Orentlicher, Relativism and Religion, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 151-54.
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Human Rights grew out of Western shame and an attempt to restrain the barbarism committed in the West during World War II,rather than out of a sense of
"Western triumphalism"; and (3) it is precisely the most arguably "Western"
aspect of human rights doctrine-the focus on individualism-that makes it appealing to oppressed people around the world and that it therefore needs no
apology. Ignatieff argues that rather than address these challenges by seeking to
achieve universality of consent to human rights norms among all cultures and
nations (which inevitably results in toothless standards), Western defenders of
human rights should seek to justify their claims in terms of universality of the
interests of the powerless which, at base, involves the demand that state power
be exercised over them only in ways that respect their autonomy as individual
moral agents. Ignatieff returns to the point that "human rights as agency" does
not necessarily entail adopting substantive Western standards or ways of life.
"are
Instead, it simply requires creating conditions under which the powerless
'1 6
free to avail themselves of such [substantive] rights as they want."
IV.
A PATH TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS

Human Rights is an important book because it identifies and confronts serious challenges to the legitimacy of international human rights doctrine. While
recognizing the value of Ignatieff's analysis, this review proposes another conception of human rights that addresses some of the challenges raised in the book
without necessarily adopting the minimalist conception Ignatieff proposes. That
conception requires Western nations who are proponents of international human
rights worldwide to seriously treat human rights law as "law" domestically. Although such an effort by Western nations would not resolve all the challenges
Ignatieff identifies, it would help address the external cultural crisis, while lessening the need for complex metaphysical justifications for this body of law.17
16. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 72. Professor
Hollinger's essay argues that Ignatieff's suggested minimalist conception of human rights may not
be as minimal as it seems. Hollinger offers what can be called the "Barbie versus the Burqa"
argument. Ignatieff claims that human rights is consistent with moral pluralism to the extent that it
seeks not to define the substantive standards of what is a "good" life, but only to protect the
"agency" necessary for people to make that choice for themselves. Taking the position of a hypothetical "patriarchal, theocratic authoritarian" ("PTA"), Hollinger argues that many cultures may
view even Ignatieff's minimalist conception with great suspicion, as a "wedge" or slippery slope that
is ultimately more subversive of these cultures than he admits. Hollinger's critique, at base, asks
what young girl growing up under this PTA, if given only the "agency" that Ignatieff advocates,
would actually choose the PTA's substantive view of what is good (the burqa)over the freewheeling
Western substantive values Ignatieff claims his proposal disavows (Barbie). Thus, the PTA would
argue, Ignatieff's minimalism is minimal in name only. See David A. Hollinger, Debates with the
PTA and Others, in HuMArN RIGHTS, supra note 2, 117-26. Ignatieff, in rebuttal, concedes that the
PTAs of the world may indeed view his agenda this way, but argues that a minimalist conception is
still justified, given the small likelihood of the worldwide establishment of constitutional democracy
and liberal tolerance worldwide. See Ignatieff, Dignity and Agency, in HUMAN RIoIrrs, supra note
2, at 171-72.
17. One portion of Professor Appiah's commentary focuses on whether there is really a need
for the types of metaphysical justifications Ignatieff offers. Appiah argues:
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Increasingly, United States courts are being presented with claims based, at
least partially, on international human rights law.' 8 There are four primary situations in which litigants present such claims: (1) litigation brought in U.S. courts
by a citizen of another country for abuse that occurred in a foreign country;' 9 (2)
litigation brought by a foreign national against the United States for violations of
international human rights law; 20 (3) suits brought by U.S. citizens against foreign governments or entities; 2 1 and (4) cases where a U.S. citizen sues the
United States for violations of international law, based on actions occurring
within the United States. Only cases within the second and fourth categories
truly address the issues raised in Human Rights. Suits in U.S. courts against
[w]e do not need to agree that we are all created in the image of God, or that we have
natural rights that flow from our human essence, to agree that we do not want to be
tortured by government officials... for many of our human rights, the reason why we
do not need to ground them in any particular metaphysics is that they are already
grounded in many metaphysics ....
K. Anthony Appiah, Grounding Human Rights, in HUMAN RiGHTs, supra note 2, at 106. Appiah
questions the value of what he calls "high doctrine" (i.e., fully theorized agreement on the moral
basis for international human rights law) as opposed to a pragmatic, deliberate silence. He believes
that human rights treaties can perhaps best be defended by arguing simply that they operate to offer
people protections against oppression that most oppressed people desire. Id. at 108. This review
takes a somewhat similar approach in arguing that a demonstrated consistent application of international human rights law as "law" within Western nations is important even in the absence of a fully
consistent explanation of its metaphysical underpinnings.
18. This review focuses primarily on the judiciary's treatment of human rights law for the
simple reason that one of the central attributes of what we consider "law" in the United States is the
rule of law: that substantive rights may be privately enforced in the courts by individuals, without
regard to the whims of the Executive Branch. To the extent that human rights law is only domestically enforceable in the United States when the Executive Branch says so, it is not "law" in the
traditional sense of the word. The proper role of Congress in construing and applying human rights
law is significantly more complicated and is examined (briefly) below.
19. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991), is the primary vehicle for such
litigation. See, e.g, Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. See, e.g., Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), wherein
the plaintiffs challenged interception and return of Haitian refugees on several grounds, one of which
was that the action was a violation of the United States' duties under the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention"). Note, however, that the court used the Refugee Convention as an interpretive aid to construing the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and did not
hold that the Refugee Convention itself provided enforceable rights. See id. at 1367 ("[Pllaintiffs'
arguments regarding the self-executing nature of Article 33.1 of the Refugee Convention are largely
academic, since §243(h)(1) [of the INA] provides coextensive protection."). Further, the Supreme
Court subsequently reversed the Second Circuit's holding in McNary. See Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). See also Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting asylum seekers' claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act that their treatment in INS detention
violated the law of nations as embodied in various international human rights agreements). But see
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other grounds, 654
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), wherein the district court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a "Marielito" Cuban who claimed that his continued indefinite detention violated customary international law
norms against arbitrary detention. The Tenth Circuit, however, in affirming the judgment, did not
hold that these norms of customary international law themselves provided a basis for relief. As in
McNary, the court construed the relevant statutory provisions (as informed by international law) to
require the petitioner's release. 654 F.2d at 1389-90.
21. Suits under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1991), (which allows
U.S. citizens or foreign nationals to sue in federal court for torture or extrajudicial killing by a
foreign government), provide an example of such litigation. See, e.g, Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (suit by expatriate citizens of Guatemala and U.S. citizen against former
Guatemalan Defense Minister for abuse by Guatemalan military).
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foreign governments or entities, whether by a U.S. citizen or a foreign national,
do not impose any great costs on the United States beyond the resources expended in entertaining such suits in federal court. Such suits, while they are
laudable in providing a forum for resolution of serious human rights claims, and
although they do contribute to the growing international judicial dialogue on
human rights, do not rebut any of the criticisms Ignatieff analyzes concerning
Western cultural imperialism, "American exceptionalism," or hypocrisy.22
Cases where the plaintiff seeks to hold the United States' domestic feet to the
international human fights fire, on the other hand, have one of the essential attributes of "law," if by law we mean a consistently binding set of obligations
that may be enforced by individuals. Such cases are rarely successful in domestic courts, and therefore feed the perception of human rights as mere platitudes
that may be disregarded at will.
The primary criticism of treating international human rights as enforceable
law in the United States rests on the allegedly countermajoritarian nature of
international human rights law, or what Ignatieff calls "American exceptionalism. ''23 U.S. courts have been extremely hesitant to give domestic effect to
international human rights law, despite the fact that the Constitution makes international law part of the "supreme law of the land."2 4 As a recent federal
22. For example, the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga, supra note 19, where the court
applied customary international law to determine that the torture of a Paraguayan national by another
Paraguayan national was cognizable in U.S. courts in a suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, was an
important step forward in the recognition of international human rights law as "law" that can be
enforced in United States courts. Research reveals no comparable decision upholding a claim seeking to apply international human rights law to actions perpetrated by the United States against U.S.
nationals. But see, e.g., Buell, supra note 8, where the court at least considered a challenge based on
international law to the death penalty.
23. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, in HUMAN RiGHTS, supra note 2, at 12-14.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, §1, cl. 2; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The
U.S. is therefore nominally a "monist" system. The monist/dualist dichotomy can be briefly summarized as follows. Certain constitutional regimes, including the United States, explicitly make international law part of the "law of the land" and are therefore called "monist" systems. The "dualist"
conception recognizes that international law exists, but treats it as proceeding on a completely separate plane from the domestic legal system, absent legislation specifically incorporating international
law. See Anne Bayefsky and Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States
Courts: A ComparativePerspective, 14 Mich. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1992). Although the United States
is theoretically a monist system, court decisions make clear that the U.S. is a dualist system in
practice. "Thus, the United States may breach an international obligation and become responsible
internationally-as it did when Congress enacted the Byrd Amendment which . . . required the
President to violate United Nations sanctions against [Zimbabwe]-and yet not be answerable for
such a breach in domestic courts." Lillich, infra note 37, at 369-70 (citing Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d
461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973)). The Supreme Court has indicated
that it intends federal courts to follow an approach that is monist in theory but dualist in practice, at
least as regards anything other than a signed, ratified, self-executing treaty (or one for which Congress has enacted implementing legislation). See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
667 (1992) (recognizing that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty "has the force of law," but holding
that it could not be directly enforced by the judiciary because it is not self-executing). One response
to this argument is that the fact that something is not enforceable by the judiciary does not mean that
it is not "law"; it just deals with who may enforce that law. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that the disparate impact regulations to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 do not themselves create a private cause of action, but noting the validity of those regulations
and that they could be enforced by the Executive Branch). The most obvious rejoinder to this
response is that rights construed in such a manner are virtually useless. Regulatory agencies could
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district court decision illustrates, however, individual domestic enforcement of
international human rights law is in no way contrary to the United States' constitutional regime. In Standt v. New York, 25 the plaintiff, a German citizen, was
arrested in the United States. He was not informed of his right, under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), 2 6 to contact the German Consulate nor was he permitted to do so despite his repeated requests. 27 Standt
sued, alleging, inter alia, a Section 198328 claim for violation of his right under
the VCCR to contact his consulate upon arrest in a foreign country. 29 The court
denied defendants' motions for summary judgment on the Section 1983/VCCR
claim, holding that plaintiff could pursue an affirmative claim under Section
1983 for violation of the rights secured by the VCCR.
Given the generally dim view U.S. courts take of direct, individual enforcement of international treaties, the results in Standt seems surprising. The Standt
court, however, did not treat the proposition that plaintiff could enforce this
treaty via Section 1983 as particularly controversial. Rather, the court treated
the VCCR as it would any other federal "law" that a plaintiff seeks to enforce
via Section 1983. In resolving the question of the VCCR's enforceability, the
court also looked to relevant international law, akin to principles of statutory
interpretation, in interpreting the treaty. Moreover, the Standt court considered
the VCCR's legislative history (or travaux preparatoires)and relevant precedent of other countries in resolving the question. All of these steps-examining
the treaty as it would other federal "law"; applying principles of statutory interpretation; looking at the treaty's legislative history; and examining the persuasive precedent of other courts that have considered the question-contribute to
the recognition of international law as "law." For purposes of this review, the
reasoning in Standt is at least as important as its result.
The Standt court began by recognizing that the inquiry into whether the
plaintiff has standing to enforce a treaty essentially asks the same question as
whether the treaty is self-executing: both inquiries seek to determine whether the
treaty creates an individually enforceable right. 30 Turning to this inquiry, the
Standt court first looked at international legal principles of treaty interpretation.
The court noted, looking to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
the inquiry must begin with the plain language of the treaty. 3' Where the language of the treaty is unclear or contradictory, resort may be had to the legislaenforce these federal rights, but they seldom do, given political concerns and limited resources. See
Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98, Bureau of Justice Statistic Special Report,
NCJ 173427 at 3 (Jan. 2000) (of all civil rights actions filed during the period studied, the percentage
of cases where the United States was plaintiff ranged from a high of 4.0% to a low of 1.2%).
25. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
27. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002) provides a civil remedy for violations of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
29. Plaintiff also alleged a variety of claims, not directly relevant to this article, arising from
his mistreatment and abuse at the hands of the police. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
30. Id. at 423.
31. Id. at 424, citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982);
Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2000).
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tive history as an aid in determining the treaty's intent. Both the plain language
and the legislative history, the court concluded, established that the VCCR does
confer enforceable rights on the individual.32 The court further found that the
practices of other countries supported its interpretation of the VCCR as conferring individually enforceable rights. 33 Having concluded that the VCCR conferred individual rights, the Standt court then held that such rights were
enforceable via Section341983 under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Blessing v. Freestone.
The decision in Standt should not be overstated as a broad mandate that
international human rights law is domestically enforceable in U.S. courts in
every circumstance. Standt dealt with a particular treaty of limited application
and concluded that it could be enforced via Section 1983 because its examination of the treaty indicated that it created a federal "right." It remains to be seen
whether Standt's reasoning can be extended to other human rights treaties, 35 and
resolution of that question must await further cases relying on treaties that may
or may not create enforceable federal "rights" under a Blessing analysis. It must
also be noted that Standt dealt with a signed and ratified treaty. 36
32. Id. at 424-27.
33. Id. at 426 (noting practice in, for example, Canada, Argentina, and Mexico).
34. 520 U.S. 329 (1997). Blessing requires a multi-part inquiry in determining whether federal
law creates a "right" enforceable under §1983. First, the plaintiff must establish the violation of a
federal right by demonstrating that (1)Congress intended that the provision in question benefit the
plaintiff; (2) the right asserted is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain
judicial competence; and (3) the statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation. Once plaintiff
has met this test, the defendant may rebut plaintiff's prima facie case by demonstrating that Congress specifically intended to foreclose a § 1983 remedy by providing a comprehensive mechanism
for protecting the federal right, such as a comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme. Id.at
340-41. A defendant cannot easily carry its burden of rebutting the presumption of enforceability
under §1983 once the plaintiff has met its prima facie case. Congress is presumed to legislate
against the background of §1983 and therefore contemplate private enforcement when it creates
federal rights, unless there is substantial legislative evidence to the contrary. Id. at 346.
35. Whether the VCCR can properly be characterized as a "human rights" treaty, in the same
sense as, for example, the Intemational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"), raises interesting questions. Courts may be more willing to hold that treaties
such as the VCCR are domestically enforceable because (1) they are necessary for the protection and
effective functioning of U.S. citizens abroad and (2) by definition, they will be limited in application
because such a claim could only be brought in the United States by a foreign national, not as a matter
of course by U.S. citizens alleging, for example, racial discrimination. On the other hand, domestically enforcing a convention such as the VCCR may rebut one of the claims raised by Ignatieff's
book, namely, that human rights should be limited to protecting those "negative rights" necessary to
protect "agency." After all, the right to consular assistance under the VCCR is clearly a right "to"
something, not just a freedom "from" something. Cf Amy Gutmann, Introduction, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at ix (arguing that many human rights are more than "negative" freedoms
necessary to protect "agency": "[tihe right to subsistence is as necessary for human agency as a right
against torture."). On the other hand, the only affirmative obligation a country has under the VCCR
is to "notify" a foreign national of his right to consular assistance.
36. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427 ("The VCCR, as a ratified treaty, is, of course, the
supreme law of the land") (emphasis added). The United States has signed and ratified certain
relatively non-controversial human rights treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The U.S. has also signed and ratified CERD and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but with several key reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs). The debate over whether unratified treaties or treaties the

2002]

THE MOTE IN THY BROTHER'S EYE

Moreover, the Standt court did not directly address the debate over whether
non-self-executing treaties are directly enforceable in a private cause of action,
nor did it address whether customary international law, 3 7 not codified in a
treaty, is domestically enforceable. The Standt court, in fact, may have made a
fairly serious analytical error by not clearly indicating whether it was finding
that (1) the treaty was self-executing because it created individually enforceable
rights, and therefore directly enforceable in a private lawsuit in the absence of
implementing legislation or (2) the treaty was enforceable via Section 1983 regardless of whether it was self-executing, as long as it created rights resting with
the individual, rather than (or in addition to) State parties. By conflating the two
issues, it is unclear whether the court meant to hold that only self-executing
treaties are enforceable via Section 1983. If that is the holding to be drawn from
Standt, the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Blessing.
The distinction is between rights and remedies. Where a court finds that a
treaty is self-executing, the result should be the same as where a court finds that
a federal statute or regulation gives rise to an implied private cause of action
under a Cort v. Ash 38 analysis: the individual may enforce it directly without
relying on other legislation. In contrast, where federal legislation (or a treaty, in
this case) is determined to provide a federal "right" under a Blessing analysis,
United States has declared to be non-self-executing are domestically enforceable in U.S. courts is
ably addressed elsewhere (see, e.g., Carlos Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992); Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 24), and need not be
repeated here, except to say that even a declaration of "non-self-execution" by the Executive Branch
does not necessarily render the treaty non-enforceable by the judiciary via § 1983, since "non-selfexecuting" is a fairly narrow technical doctrine meaning that the treaty does not create a "freestanding" private cause of action. For example, in the RUDs to the ICCPR, the United States stated that
"the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts." See Sloss, infra note 39, at
166 (discussing the U.S.'s reservations to the ICCPR). As this review explains, however, this does
not necessarily mean that the ICCPR is not enforceable via §1983; it only means that the treaty,
standing alone, does not create a basis for individuals to sue under it directly.
37. Arguably, customary international law provides an independent source of enforceable
human rights law beyond that codified in treaties. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 367, 368 (1985) (citing The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)). While customary international law is clearly part of the
"supreme law of the land," an argument that customary international law is directly enforceable in
U.S. courts may raise questions about "countermajoritarianism," since customary international law is
not subject to the same checks and balances as domestic legislation. There is substantial authority,
however, for concluding that customary international law may, consistent with the U.S. Constitution,
create a private right of action for its violation. See, e.g., White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1384
(E.D. Wa. 1998) ("This Court can conceive of no reason why the rationale supporting the existence
of judicial authority to recognize implied remedies for constitutional rights [under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)] does not apply with equal or greater force to jus
cogens norms of international law, such as the prohibitions on genocide, torture, and slavery.")
(refusing, however, to imply such a cause of action for alleged violation of the ICCPR in that case).
Nonetheless, as explained infra, an action to enforce customary international law via §1983 does not
raise such concerns. See infra p. 15.
38. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Under Cort,a federal statute not explicitly containing a private cause
of action may be found to contain one implicitly where: (1) plaintiff is a member of the class Congress intended to benefit; (2) there are indications of legislative intent to create a remedy for violation of the statute; (3) it is consistent with the purpose of the legislation to imply a remedy; and (4)
where the remedy is not one traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 78.
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Section 1983 provides the cause of action, regardless of whether the statute (or
treaty) gives rise to an implied private cause of action (or whether the treaty is
self-executing). In other words, the self-executing/implied private cause of action analysis is applied to determine whether the treaty or federal statute itself
creates a mechanism for a private party to assert the violation in court. Under a
Blessing inquiry, whether the treaty is self-executing (i.e., whether it creates a
cause of action) is irrelevant, because Section 1983 itself provides the cause of
action once it is shown that plaintiff is asserting a federal "right"-in the case of
treaties, Section 1983 is the "implementing legislation" once the Blessing test is
met. 39 The better view of Standt therefore is that it looked to whether the
VCCR conferred individual rights not to determine whether it was truly selfexecuting, but to determine whether it was "intended to benefit the plaintiff'
under Blessing and therefore enforceable via Section 1983.40
But neither should the result and reasoning in Standt be understated. Standt
is one of the few cases to take domestic application of international law seriously, 4 ' and the only case thus far to hold, as had been urged by many scholars
for years,42 that an international human rights treaty is enforceable via Section
1983. Moreover, the reasoning in Standt is equally applicable to other human
rights treaties (ratified or unratified, self-executing or non-self-executing) and,
indeed, to customary international law, even if the result on the facts of those
cases is different. The reasoning in Standt can and should be extended to other
claims brought under international human rights treaties or customary interna39. See, e.g., South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 520-24 (D.N.J. 2001) (explaining the differences between the two inquiries and holding that the Supreme Court's rejection of a "freestanding" implied private cause of
action under Title VI's disparate impact regulations in Sandoval, supra note 24, did not preclude a
claim to enforce those regulations via §1983). South Camden was reversed on appeal by the Third
Circuit, but not on grounds that affect the analysis here. See 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). The two
inquiries-"self-executing/implied cause of action" and "federal right" under § 1983-do overlap in
one respect: both ask whether the provision in question is intended to benefit the plaintiff. Yet they
are not identical. See South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 520-21. There is substantial authority for
concluding that the question of whether a treaty is self-executing is analytically the same as whether
it creates an implied private cause of action. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International
Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
129, 151 n. 119 (1999) (citing cases treating the analysis as the same). As Sandoval, Blessing and
South Camden demonstrate, the fact that a federal statute (or regulation or an international treaty)
does not create a "freestanding" implied private cause of action does not preclude an action to
enforce it via Section 1983, where the statute or treaty creates a federal "right" under a Blessing
analysis.
40. Standt's result is also limited because the court did not actually hold that the plaintiffs
claim was ultimately successful; rather, it denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the Section 1983VCCR claim. Further, the decision in Standt is, after all, only that of a single
federal district court, though the opinion subsequently has been cited in a concurring opinion in New
Mexico v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 282-83 (N.M. 2001) (Minzner, J., concurring) (citing
Standt in disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that the VCCR does not create individually
enforceable rights).
41. See generally Lillich, supra note 37 (discussing major cases invoking international human
rights law in U.S. courts).
42. Scholars have advocated an approach similar to Standt's as a means of working around the
self-executing treaty doctrine. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 36, at 1143-57; Sloss, supra note 39, at
152.
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tional law. Nor is such extension merely a theoretical exercise intended to bolster the abstract legitimacy of international human rights law. Quite apart from
the question of whether human rights can trump contrary aspects of U.S. domestic law (e.g., whether international law can be used to challenge the U.S. death
penalty) is the use of international human rights law to fill very real gaps in the
United States' protection of human rights under the Constitution or federal
statutes.43
Further, the limitations in an action to enforce international human rights
law via Section 1983 may actually be a benefit in addressing one of the challenges Ignatieff addresses-the "countermajoritarian" issue or "internal" Western critique. A claim brought directly under international law arguably raises
the same concerns as judicially-created implied private causes of action under
federal statutes; namely, that the judicial branch will create free-standing, unlimited rights to sue that cannot be checked by the people's elected representatives.
An action to enforce international human rights law via Section 1983 minimizes
such concerns because it has an external check in the popular will. If "the people" disagree with such a legal remedy, they can convince Congress to amend
44
Section 1983 to explicitly foreclose it.
Truly treating international human rights law as "law" within the United
States, by engaging in the type of analysis illustrated by the Standt decision,
45
surely will not address all of the issues Ignatieff identifies in Human Rights.

43. One scholar characterizes this as the use of international human rights law to redress "nonfrivolous, non-redundant claims." Sloss, supra note 39, at 171-72. Sloss provides one hypothetical
example of where international human rights law could operate to address a non-frivolous, nonredundant claim. He hypothesizes the Amish relying on the ICCPR's provisions on religious freedom to challenge application of a state statute to them, even though such application would not
violate the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 130-3 1. A second example
of this "gap-filling" use of international human rights law is in the area of race discrimination. The
Supreme Court, beginning with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), has grown increasingly
fixated on the theory that claims of racial discrimination are cognizable under the Equal Protection
Clause or federal statutes that are silent on the issue only where the plaintiff can prove intentional
racial discrimination. Yet CERD does not require proof of intentional discrimination. See CERD,
supra note 35, Art. I(1) ("In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life") (emphasis added).
44. Moreover, §1983 is more limited internally than a freestanding, implied private cause of
action to directly enforce international human rights law. Section 1983 requires state action, and
thus would not provide redress for human rights violations by truly private individuals or entities.
See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (holding that there must be substantial "entwinement" with the state for a private entity to act "under color
of state law" for purposes of §1983). Litigation under §1983 may also raise defenses of absolute,
municipal and qualified immunity. Additionally, §1983 itself does not apply to rights violations by
the federal government; although a Bivens action may provide a similar cause of action against the
federal government, the Supreme Court has been far more restrictive in applying Bivens than it has
been with regard to §1983. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). Using §1983 to
litigate human rights violations in the United States does not therefore raise the specter of "rights run
amok."
45. Even if more courts adopted a Standt approach, such action would not squarely address
claims of Western cultural imperialism (i.e., focusing solely on political rights), if Standt is limited
to treaties that the United States has ratified, given that the U.S. has not ratified major treaties that
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Yet it can go a long way toward that goal, without necessitating the minimalist
justification for human rights that Ignatieff proposes. Allowing individual enforcement of international human rights law in the United States demonstrates
that the U.S. indeed "practices what it preaches," something Ignatieff recognizes
is crucial to the success and legitimacy of the human rights movement. Consider: what authoritarian regime, charged by the United States that its conduct is
outside the boundaries of human rights norms, will take such charges seriously
where the United States consistently refuses to permit domestic enforcement of
the human rights norms embodied in signed and ratified treaties? Yet that is
precisely the situation that exists today.
The consistent refusal of the U.S. judiciary to enforce human rights law at
home unquestionably weakens Western claims that human rights doctrine is
"law" abroad, leaving it open to charges of Western cultural imperialism and
hypocrisy. And it surely gives no comfort to those who need it most-the oppressed at home and abroad-to advocate, as a practical matter, a system of
"law" that only operates when it cannot be enforced domestically. Moreover,
enforcing international human rights law domestically via Section 1983 also addresses the internal Western critique that international human rights law is an
infringement of popular sovereignty. Because of the internal and external limits
on Section 1983 actions, Western opponents of treating human rights law as
"real rights" domestically cannot coherently rely on this argument.
V.
CONCLUSION

It is precisely because no single prescription for the advancement of human
rights is sufficient that the critiques presented by Ignatieff and the commentators
in Human Rights should be required reading for Western human rights advocates. Western defenders of human rights must squarely address the challenges
to the idea of human rights as trumps and the cultural and spiritual crises highlighted in Human Rights that undermine international human rights' claim to
universality. In addition to addressing the concerns raised in this excellent book
in answering human rights challenges abroad, however, Western defenders of
human rights should also engage in an equally strong effort to convince Western
nations in general and the United States in particular to treat international human
rights law as "law" domestically. Otherwise we must be prepared to explain
why what we promote as "law" abroad is merely "a good idea" at home.4 6
focus on "communitarian" rights, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
46. There is no doubt that this effort is already underway. The International Human Rights
Law Group has started a program specifically targeted at enforcement of international human rights
law in the United States. See http://www.hrlawgroup.org. The Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute
also has a similar program. See http://www.sfsu.edu/-mclicfc /hunrigghtsrep.html. The efforts of
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to draw attention to human rights
abuses in the United States are also of crucial importance. These efforts provide a resource upon
which domestic civil rights practitioners can and should draw in their cases (which many have begun
to do, either directly or through amicus briefs of human rights organizations, as is attested to by the
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cases cited in this review where human rights claims were raised in U.S. courts). These developments are directed at forming a policy of strategic litigation by practitioners in the field to build a
jurisprudential framework for incorporating international human rights standards into domestic law.

